GLOBAL trade talks would be great if only they worked. Multilateral deals mean common standards and lower barriers for all, but the Doha round, launched by the World Trade Organisation in 2001, is dead in all but name, having seemingly drawn to a close after thenegotiation of an uninspiring set of reforms in Bali in 2013. Growth in global trade volumes has slowed in recent years, and the cause of liberalisation is increasingly advanced byregional trade agreements (RTAs). The number of RTAs has risen from around 70 in 1990 to just under 300 today. The chart at the bottom shows some of the biggest. At the moment, two RTAs (with confusingly similar initialisms) hog the headlines. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would link 11 economies of the Pacific rim—including Japan and Singapore—with America. These 12 countries together account for 40% of world GDP and one-third of trade. Meanwhile, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is an ambitious planned trade deal between America and the EU.

These new deals not only involve fewer countries, but tend to have a different focus to previous trade deals. The focus of TPP, for instance, is less on dismantling tariff barriers and more on tackling tough issues such as intellectual property, labour and environmental standards. This reflects the fact that traditional tariffs are already low after decades of trade liberalisation. What’s more, services form a bigger part of global GDP than ever before; making trade easier would boost incomes across the world. American trade negotiators predict that by 2025 the TPP will make the world $220 billion a year richer, adding roughly 1% to GDP. TTIP has a similar focus. This deal focuses on regulatory and other non-tariff barriers, since levies on most products traded across the Atlantic are already close to zero (exceptions include running shoes and fancy chocolate). Negotiators dream of a world in which pharmaceuticals are subject to the same testing regimes, standards on everything from car design to chemical labelling are harmonised or mutually recognised. The potential benefits are hard to estimate, but one reasonable guess is that TTIP could raise America’s GDP by 0.4% and the EU’s by slightly more.

Nonetheless, opposition is strong. As trade deals wade into complex regulatory waters, it is far harder to gauge their impact. Even some economists who have long been strong proponents of free trade argue that the boost to growth from the new deals will be small. In the case of TPP, Barack Obama, the American president, has struggled to convince his own party of the benefits. Many Democratic politicians fret that imports from low-cost countries such as Vietnam will hurt American workers in industries such as carmaking and textiles. It looks as though Mr Obama has won his battle; on June 24th the Senate is expected to vote to give Mr Obama the authority he needs to finish off the negotiations.

Resistance to TTIP is of a different hue. The deal, cry some, will permit American multinationals to undercut tough European standards, or to buy up parts of Britain’s National Health Service. Opposition is rather strong in Germany, not previously a bastion of anti-trade activists. Germans have focused on Chlorhühnchen (chlorine-soaked chicken), an example of the horrors that TTIP’s opponents say would be forced down European throats if doors were opened to American products. For now, haters of American poultry need not worry. TTIP talks are floundering. It is less of a priority for the Obama administration than the TPP; and Europe has other things to worry about. At times, RTAs seem no easier to negotiate than grand global agreements.